Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

8-1-1978

Japan’s Great Depression
Tuvia Blumenthal

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
Blumenthal, Tuvia, "Japan’s Great Depression" (1978). Discussion Papers. 303.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/303

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY

Box 1987, Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut

CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 295

JAPAN'S "GREAT DEPRESSION''

Tuvia Blumenthal
August

Note:

1978

Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials cir
culated to stimulate discussion and critical comment.
References in publications to Discussion Papers should
be cleared with the author to protect the tentative
character of these papers.

1.

Introduction
Although the "Great Depression" was a world-wide phenomenon it had

different manifestations in different countries.

The depth of the depres

sion, its duration, the degree to which various sectors of the economy
were affected by it, the transmission mechanism, the role of economic

policy and the effect on the political system were all different from one
country to another.

The purpose of the present paper is to describe and

analyze the causes and manifestations of the great depression in Japan,
and while doing so dispel some of the myths related to it.

It must be

remembered that a depression is not only an economic phenomenon but
has impor~ant

sociological and psychological aspects.

It causes a great

deal of human suffering and reference to it is often loaded with emotions.
It is fertile soil for political movements to pursue their goals and pro
vides material for popular writers to paint exaggerated pictures.

The

great depression in Japan is usually described as a traumatic event that
disrupted the economy, with vivid descriptions of masses of unemployed
roaming the streets.

The fact that following the depression Japan took

the path which led to war and destruction serves to magnify the size of
the economic catastrophy.

It is, therefore, interesting to look at the

Japanese case from an international perspective and see whether the con
ventional view can be maintained.
A second question has to do with the inter-relations hip between the
depression and Japan's return to the gold standard on January II', 1930.
It has often been argued that returning to the gold standard at this point
of time has either caused, or largely intensified, the depression in Japan.
In order to assess this view we have to look at different aspects of the
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gold standard system and evaluate the effect of each on economic performance.
It is often argued that the main problem was in that Japan returned to the
gold standard at the prewar par, while the internal implications of the
monetary system are neglected.

This view needs to be scrutinized.

The discussion proceeds as follows:

in section 2 we compare Japan

to other countries and draw some conclusions about the special features
of the Japanese case.

Section 3 discusses the return to the gold standard

and its various effects, and section 4 gives a summary and conclusions.
2.

The "Great Depression" in Japan
The great depression in Japan is pictured in different, almost con

trary ways in the Japanese literature and in references to it by
foreign scholars.

While the Japanese regard it as a catastrophy of major

proportions, it is considered to have been fairly mild by foreign observers
who study the American or European case.

Let us look at the great depres

sion in Japan from an international perspective and see how Japan fared
relative to other countries.

Table 1 compares the rate of growth of the

Japanese economy with that of the U.S. and several European countries.
(Table 1)
Japan is the only country where no absolute decline in GNP took place,
while the accumulated reduction in GNP amounted to more than 30% in the
U.S., more than 25% in Germany, more than 10% in France and Sweden, and
about 5% in the U.K.

The events in Japan as judged by these figures do not

deserve the name of a "great" depression but of a relatively mi-Id one.

1

-3-

Since the depressio n is often referred to as one that started in
and had a large effect on the industria lized countries , we compare in
Table 2 indices of industria l productio n of several countries . This table,
(Table 2)
too, indicates that the effect of the depressio n on the industria l sector
in Japan was relativel y mild.

Compared to a decline of about 54% in the

U.S. and Germany, 28% in France and 17% in the United Kingdom, industria l
productio n in Japan stood at its lowest point in 1931 at only 6% below
the 1929 level.

2

Much of the concern with depressio ns (and with the "great depressio n"
in particula r) had to do with the question of employme nt.

Unfortun ately,

no overal 1 unemploym ent figures are available for Japan at this period.
Japan did not have an unemployment insurance system such as England, nor
were data collected by trade unions as in the U.S.

In Japan there is a

widesprea d view that the number of unemploye d at the bottom of the depres
sion amounted to three million workers.
Sato challenge d this figure which was based on employmen t
statistic s of the Bank of Japan.

He showed that these statistic s reflect

only the situation in the modern sector of the economy, composed of large
scale companies , which suffered more than the tradition al, medium-sm all
scale ones.

Another source of bias was introduce d by the fact that

some of the companies who were large in 1929 became smaller in 1933 and
were eliminate d from the census.

Furthermo re, and most important , the

number of three million unemploye d is not compatibl e with the fact that
output in the non-agric ultural sector declined by only 0.5% in 1930 and
increased by 3.7% in 1931.

Taking these factors into account Sato con-

eludes that the nurnher of unemploye d was about one million. 3
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Let us first look at some published figures on unemployment rates.
As mentioned before, there was no systematic collection of unemployment

data in Japan but there are estimates supplied by the Home Ministry.4
These are presented in Table 3 together with data for several other coun(Table 3)
tries. According to these figures the unemployment rate in Japan was
much less than in the U.S., the U.K. or Germany, not only at the lowest
point of the depression but _e~en compared ti the 1929 rate of unemployment
in these countries.

A similar picture is obtained by the use of Ohkawa's

5
estimates of gainfully occupied population which show that employment in
all industries hasactually increased in 1930 by 2jS,OOO and only in 1931
was there a reduction of 629,000 (the respective figures fur non-agriculture
are 248,000 and 712,000). This serves to support Sato's contention that

total open unemployment was, at its worst, not more than one million
workers. 6

As is aleo mentioned by Sato, the relatively small reduction

in total output precludes the existence of wide-spread disguised unem
ployment in the economy, over and above that which was there before the
depression.

7

One of the main victims of the depression was world trade, the
volume of which decreased by about one quarter from 1929 to 1932, as
shown in the last column of Tahle 4. The decline was more pronounced
(Table 4)
in Europe, where trade fell by almost 40%. In Japan, however, the effect
of the depression was very mild by comparison, only a 3% decline from

1929 to 1930, a recovery to the 1929 level in 1931 and a staggering 23%
increase in 1932. 8 From this it can be deducted that there was no
marked unemployment in the export industries.
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In the light of the preceding section it appears that what has to
be explained is not so much why the depression occurred in Japan but why
it took such a mild form, relative to other countries.

One logical ex

planation is that Japan was less industrializ ed than other countries.
This explanation can, however, be dismissed because countries who engaged
in export of agricultura l goods and raw materials were hard hit by the
depression.

Moreover, in Japan itself it was the agricultura l sector that

bore the brunt of the depression.
9
A second explanation , presented by Lewis; is that prices in Japan
were more flexible in their downward movement than in other countries,
so that the effect of the depression was more on prices and less on
quantit:l.,es.

This is mainly true in respect to export prices which

went down to the extent that en~bled Japan to sell the same quantity
of exports.

It must be emphasized, and this will be an important point

in the following discussion, that the reduction in prices of Japanese
goods in foreign markets was not a result of a depreciatio n in the value
of the yen.

In spite of the overvalued exchange rate export prices

adjusted themselves to changing demand conditions.

As far as domestic

prices are concerned, there is evidence to show that the average price
level in Japan indeed went down more than in other countries in 1930,
but, as seen in Table 5, less at the trough of the price cycle. While
(Table 5)
the index of wholesale prices declined by 18% in Japan in 1930, more
than in any other country, the lowest point of 69.6 was actually higher
than in all other countries except Sweden.

Thus we can conclude that,

while prices absorbed the initial shock of the depression, their overall
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performance was not much different than in other countries.
A third, and probably more important factor that served to alleviate
the consequence s of the depression, was the structure of the industrial
sector and the labor market.

A large share of total output in the

non-agricul tural sector was produced by small firms who relied on
family members rather than hired labor.1 0 The demand for the products
of these firms was quite inelastic and did not change much even under
deflationar y conditions.

The labor force of large companies, mainly

in the textile industry, was comprised of young women who, when laid
off by the companies, went back to their homes in the rural areas.
The availabilit y of cheap imports, caused by the overvalued yen, en
abled firms to get cheap raw materials and to make profits even di;ring
11
a period of declining prices.
Let us now turn to analyze the effect of the depression in the
agricultura l sector.

As mentioned before, the burden of the depression

did not fall equally on all sectors of the economy, and the agricultura l
sector was the hardest hit by it.

Since the cultivation of silk cocoons

was an important source of income for farmers, the reduction in the export
price of raw silk, amounting to about 50%, had a considerabl e impact on
farmers' income.

This was accompanied by a reduction in the price of

agricultura l commodities , mainly rice, in the domestic market, resulting
both from the reduction in demand as well as an increase in supply.
production of rice increased 12% between 1929 and 1930-!.2

The

-7-

However, we have to remember that the depression was not a blow which
landed on the agricultural sector in a period of prosperity, but one
that was superimposed on an already existing trend.

Since the beginning

of the 1920s there has been a deterioration in the performance of Japanese
agriculture, and this sector, which played an important role in the Meiji
period, showed signs of slowing down.

Several reasons have been cited

for this development, among them that existing agricultural technology
reached the limit of substantial improvements, and that the policy of
importing cheap rice from the colonies depressed prices in Japan.

This

trend was reflected in the downward movement of prices received by
farmers:

The rice price index (1934-36 = 100) went down from 140.9

in 1924 to 96.8 in 1929, before reaching the bottom of 60.2 in 1931,
while the index of prices received by farmers for all commodities
declined from 138.5 to 114.3 and 69.3 respectively.

Even the price of

cocoons started its declining trend long before the depression, going
down from 258.5 in 1925 to 170.6 and 75.5 in 1929 and 1931 respectively~ 3
The second point to note is that there was a reduction not only in
the price of farm output but also in prices paid by farmers for inputs.
As seen from Table 6, the relative price of output to inputs declined

by 14% in 1930 but recovered in 1932 with a higher value than in 1929.
(Table 6)
The reduction in input prices caught up quickly with the reduction in
output prices and left the farmers in a better position than before
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the depres sion.

In additio n,there was a decline in prices of goods

consum ed by farmers which also served to mitiga te their hardsh ip. 14
Anothe r factor which tended to allevia te the plight of the farmers
was the decline in rent.

The rent of paddy fields went down by 37% and

that of upland fields 14% between 1929 and 1930. 15 It is interes ting to
look at value-a dded in agricu lture, calcula ted at 1934~36 prices.

From

1929 to 1930 there was a 12.5% increas e in this figure, followe d by a
17.7% decrea se in 1931 but an increas e of 9.8% and 18.9% in 1932 and 1933
respec tively.

The total effect was an increas e of 21% in agricu ltural

value-a dded in fixed prices between 1929 and 1933, a year in which the
figure reached an all time record .

Anothe r indicat ion of the propos ition

that the conditi ons in the agricu ltural sector were not as bad as has
been claimed , is in the behavio r of the net capita l stock series .

There

was a continu ous, though small, annual increas e in the real net capita
l
stock, namely net investm ent was positiv e.
All this evidenc e does not mean that farmers did not suffer under
the depres sion.
of debt.

The main reason lay in the increas e of the real burden

However, the effect of the depress ion appears to be of a very

short-r un nature , not much differe nt from other calami ties which befell
Japane se agricu lture during the prewar period.
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3.

The Gold Standard
The term "gold standard" is somewhat ambiguous and may include all

or some of the following:

(1) full convertibility of fiat money into gold,

(2) permission to buy gold bullions from the central bank and ship them
abroad, (3) a committment of the government to a fixed exchange rate with
the value of domestic currency defined in terms of gold, and (4) a fixed
ratio between currency in circulation and the amount of gold reserves held
by the central bank.

When Japan went off the gold standard on September 12,

1917, it was done through an imposition of an embargo on gold exports, but
at the same time it was also a transition from a fixed to a floating exchange
rate regime.

Nevertheless, another feature of the gold standard, namely the

gold reserve requirements with respect to domestic currency, was left
intact.

The return to the gold standard in 1930 was done through the abo

lition of the embargo on gold shipment, thus fixing the exchange rate in
terms of gold, or, what amounted to the same thing (since the U.S. was on
the gold standard) in terms of the American dollar, at the prewar rate
of $49 3/8 per¥ 100.

It was, of course, possible for Japan to return to

the gold standard and at the same time devalue the yen.

Decisions about

return to gold (abolition of the gold embargo) and rate of exchange were,
therefore, two independent decisions, although, in the minds of many, they
were regarded as one and the same.

There was one sense in which these

two decisions came to fulfil the same basic goal.

Rightly or

.-wrongly, it was felt that being off the gold standard (at a time when
virtually all indus.trialized countries returned to it) and devaluing
the currency would undermine Japan's position in the world economy.
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The abolition of the embargo on gold exports, implemented on
January 11, 1930, culminated repeated efforts on the part of several
-government s during the 20s to accomplish this act, efforts which failed
for one reason or another.

In the early 20s, when Japan still had large

reserves of foreign exchange, accumulated during World War I, the
embargo was not effective and its abolition could be carried out easily,
but when the Kato government finally declared its intention to do so the
Kanto earthquake in 1923, followed by a large import surplus, made
implementat ion impossible.

An adverse balance of payments in the late

20s made it necessary to take extensive preparatory measures before
the gold standard could be re-installe d.

These measures were taken by

the Hamaguchi cabinet, with Junnosuke Inouye, the long-time advocate of
a return to the gold standard, as its finance minister, and on November
21, 1929 the government declared its intention to abolish the embargo,
which was duly carried out at the beginning of the following year.
During this period two crucial questions bad to be answered:

The

first was a question of timing; a prerequisit e for successful re-adoption
of the gold standard was the establishme nt of favorable internal, as well
as external, conditions.

If Japan was not to lose a large amount of its

gold reserves (and it was expected that some, even considerabl e, outflow
would occur), domestic prices should not be rising when the step is taken;
therefore a deflationar y policy was called for.

Moreover, since the

-balance of payments is affected by the terms of trade, rather than by
the absolute level of domestic prices, it was necessary that domestic
deflationar y policy should not be sterilized by a reduction in prices
abroad.

The second question was concerned with the exchange rate,

-11-

namely whether to return to gold at the old, pre-1917, par or at a
devalued rate.

Japan could observe examples of both alternatives:

· England, who returned to the gold standard in 1925 at the prewar par,
and France, who in 1928 chose to devaluate the franc by 80 percent
relative to the prewar exchange rate.

The advantages of a devaluation

were that the transition be easier, no strong deflationary measures
were needed and speculation, in favor of the yen prior to and against
the yen after the event, would not arise.
As mentioned above, it would be wrong to regard the return to the
gold standard from purely a technical economic aspect..

The

step was conceived to have educational merit, both at home and abroad.
It was aimed at a reduction in conspicious constunption, an increase in
saving and frugality, a move towards restructuring industry and increas
ing efficiency and at the same time enable Japan to become a member of
the group of respectable nations, all of whom were already on the
gold standard at that time.

Some of Japan's leaders thought that the

great boom which had occurred during World War I caused people to lose
qualities which were deemed necessary for a country to develop at a rapid
pace, qualities that could be restored by a "shock treatment" of a mild
recession. There was, however, one factor which could not be foreseen: the
return to the gold standard coincided with the world depression which
started in the U.S. and spread rapidly to all industrialized countries.
There is no doubt that timing was wrong.

It is, however, doubtful
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whether a return to gold at a somewhat depreciated rate would have resulted
in a depression of much lesser degree.

Let us see why we believe that the

~eturn to gold had a relatively small impact on the course taken by the
economy.
Before we address ourselves to this issue, it may be instructive to
ask why Japan did choose to fix the value of the yen at the old par.

Three

types of considerations eocnomic, political and moral led to this decision.
As mentioned before, the re-adoption of the gold standard was preceded by

a period of preparations, in which a deflationary policy in Japan was aimed
at the elimination of the import surplus and the restoration of the exchange
rate at its prewar level.

These two targets have been largely achieved:

in 1929 Japan had a trade surplus and the yen climbed up to its desired
rate.

While the last phenomenon was, to a large extent, the result of

speculation, it looked as if the prewar par really represented a long-run
equilibrium of foreign exchange.

There was also a more immediate reason;

an outstanding loan amounting to 230 million yen in 4% government bonds was
due for repayment in the London market and could be renewed, according to
the Japanese view, only if Japan manifested the strength of its economy
by returning to the gold standard.

The political consideration was related

to the power struggle within the Japanese Diet: a change in the rate of
exchange could be implemented only through passage of a law.

Since the

ruling Minseito party was only the second largest party, 16 and in the face
of objections by members of the Seiyukai opposition party, the amendment
to the law would encounter strong opposition.

On

the other hand, a return

to the old par took the form of an abolition of the 1917 decree (which
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required permission for the export of gold) by the Minister of Finance,
and no approval by the Diet was necessary.

17

The moral argument was that

devaluation would be degrading for Japan and that even if a return to
the old par were to impose hardship on the Japanese people this would
have beneficial results in the long-run.
With

hindsight,

it

is clear that Japan did not choose the right

time to return to the gold standard, but the question we have to anwer
is whether, given the external developments, the return to gold at the old
par did greatly aggrevate economic conditions.
In order to do so we shall look at three issues: (1) the effect
of the exchange rate on the balance of payments.
gold outflow on money and prices.

(3) The effect of speculation and

anti-speculation government policy.
a.

(2) The effect of the

Let us look at them in succession.

The effect of the return to gold at the prewar par on Japanese trade:
Let us assume that Japan would have devalued the yen at the time of

her re-adoption of the gold standard.

How would it affect Japanese

exports and imports and what would be the impact on the distribution of
income?

The argument for devaluation is that it reduces the price of

domestic goods in foreign markets and thus increases the volume of
exports.

This argument is true when export pr!ce~ are determined

according to domestic prices.

However, as we mentioned before 1 pri~es

of Japanese-made goods in foreign markets slumped without a devaluation.
The Japanese sold their products accepting for it "what the traffic
would bear", and doing so were able, unlike other countries, to keep
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the volume at almost the same level.

18

It seems very unlikely, in these

circumstances, that a devaluation would have substantially increased the
volume of exports.

On

the other hand, the high value of the yen made it

possible for both Japanese industry and consumers to obtain cheap imports,
which served to counter the effect of cheaper prices of final goods and a
reduction in money income. In this context it is interesting to note that
France, who devalued the franc by 80% in 1928, suffered more from the
depression than England who returned to gold at the old par.

19

Another question is concerned with the effect of gold outflow on
the balance of payments.

After the return to gold Japan experienced a

mass outflow of gold, amounting to ¥750 million during the period 1930-32.
This development as well as other changes in the balance of payments are
presented in Table 7.

As can be seen, both exports and imports went

(Table 7)
down after 1929 but the deficit in the balance of trade did not increase.
Actually, it was substantially smaller than the average deficit during
the period 1920-28, which amounted to ¥493 million.

The outflow of gold

was, therefore, not used to bridge the gap between imports and exports
of goods and services, but was mainly motivated by speculation._
b.

Monetary effects of the return to the gold standard.
To understand the monetary effects of the gold outflow we have

first to describe the Japanese monetary system under the gold standard.
Until June 1932 the Act of Note Issue stipulated that the amount of notes
could not exceed the amount of gold plus ¥120 million, against which govern
ment securities or bonds, as well as commercial bills, were held by the Bank
of Japan.

The act was revised on July 1, 1932, and the amount of notes

not covered by gold reserves was increased to ¥1,000 million.

However,
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even before the revision, the actual amount of notes was not, in fact,
equal to the sum of gold reserves plus ¥120 million, but in excess of it,
as seen in Table 8.
(Table 8)
The effect of the outflow of gold depends on the extent to which
the government actually follows the "rules of the game" of the gold
standard, namely does not sterilize a reduction in gold reserves by an
increase in the excess of issue.

An inspection of Table 8 shows that

at first the government has kept the rules:

the reduction between 1929

and 1930 in the quantity of notes, ¥206 million, is almost equal to

the

reduction in gold reserves, ¥246 million. However, the picture is very differ
ent for the transition from 1930 to 1931, with gold reserves

decreasing

by ¥350 million but notes issued going down by only ¥106 million, with
a substantial increase in the excess issue.

The same is true for the

period since 1932; here we must note that although Japan re-imposed the
embargo on gold exports in December 1931 it was still on the gold standard as far as domestic note issue was concerned.
It is quite clear from the foregoing analysis that the gold out

flow in itself was no constraint on the ability of the Bank of Japan
to increase the issue of Bank Notes in excess of the required reserve
ratio.

It was the unwillingness of the government to increase its

borrowing from the Bank and to reflate the economy that affected the
-amount of currency.

When this reluctance was overcome, in 1931, the

gold standard was no effective constraint.
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The reduction in the note issue of the Bank of Japan had an effect on
the total amount of currency in circulation, which also included coins,
government notes and Yokohama Specie Bank notes.

At the same time there was

a reduction in the amount of deposits held by the public in commercial
banks.

As seen in Table 9 the reduction in deposits from 1930 to 1931 was
(Table 9)
twice as large as the reduction in currency and from 1930 to 1931 more

than three times as large.
Considering the relation between gold and the money supply, it is
instructive to look at the American case.

As shown by Friedman and

Schwartz, there was a reduction in the stock of money during the depres
sion despite an increase in the amount of gold reserves.

In their words:

"We did not permit the inflow of gold to expand the U.S. money stock.
We not only sterilized it, we went much further.

Our money stock moved

perversely, going down as the gold stock went up 11 •

20

The same was true in Japan, only in the opposite direction, namely
a reduction in the quantity of gold not matched by a corresponding reduc
tion in the amount of notes in circulation.

In 1930 the reduction in

gold exceeded the reduction in notes by ¥40 million, in 1931 the difference
increased to ¥258 million.

It is, therefore, impossible to blame the gold

· standard for the reduction in the stock of money, since the government
could have sterilized its effect, and, to some extent, actually did so.
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The effects of speculation and anti-speculation policies.
Expectations of a return to the gold standard at the old par, reinforced
-after the establishment of the Hamaguchi cabinet in July 1929, gave rise
to speculative demand for yen and increased its value vis-a-vis other currencies.
When, as the yen reached its old par value, the government decided that the
time was ripe for lifting the embargo, speculators acted against the yen
and demand for foeign currency increased.
ment expected this to happen

21

It must be said that the govern-

and in order to meet the increased demand for

foreign exchange, took several steps prior to lifting the embargo.

These

included an increase in foreign exchange reserves from ¥183 million at the
end of June to ¥304 million at the end of December 1929, and opening credit
lines in London and New York, to the amount of ¥100 million. 22
These steps, however, were to no avail; speculators not only sold
yen to profit on their previous transactions but, as time went on,
bought foreign currency in expectation that its value will increase
upon reimposition of the embargo.
Japan's gold reserves.

The result was a rapid dwindling of

The gold reserves of the Bank of Japan went down

from ¥1,073 million on January 10, 1930 to ¥826 million at the end of
the year, and pltm.ged further to ¥521 million on December 5, 1931: 3
The government found itself in the position of a physician, called to
treat a patient who suffers from two diseases, the cure for the one
aggrevating the other.

In order to stem speculators, a tight money

-policy was adopted and interest rates were increased.; 24
too late to curb the gold outflow.

It was, however,
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The speculative effect of lifting the gold embargo and the resulting
gold outflow may have been an important aggrevating factor but cannot be
regarded as the major cause for the depression.

Nor did the measures taken

to counter speculation have, by themselves, a considerable effect on the
economy: they were mostly taken at a late stage in the last three months
of 1931, and investment decisions were probably influenced more by expecta
tions about future demand than by changes in interest rates.
While the psychological impact of speculation and the resulting
gold outflow should not be undermined, their effect on the real side
of the economy were rather limited.

To a large extent they played

the role of a warning signal that, perhaps more than anything else,
pointed to the need for a change in policy.

This change took place on

December 13, 1931 when the new Inukai government, with Takahashi as Finance
Minister, re-imposed the embargo on gold exports, and by the use of an
expansionary economic policy, led Japan out of the depression.
Sununary and Conclusions
The three coinciding events in the early 1930s-the depression
in Japan, the world-wide depression and the policies of the Japanese
government raise the question of the causal relationship among them;
in particular, whether the depression in Japan was chiefly the outcome
of domestic factors or of imported ones.

We attempted to show that

the extent and duration of the depression in Japan were considerably
milder than in other countries and that the blame can be placed mainly
on events which were outside the control of the Japanese government.
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With present day hindsight it is, of course, possible to say that had the
government acted differently Japan may have suffered even less 9 but this
could hardly be expected when considering the "state of the art" at that
time. The decisive cause for the depression was the reduction in export
prices brought about by the decline in foreign demand.

Devaluation of the

yen would be quite ineffective in increasing export quantities and would
have had an inverse effect on import prices.

The quantity of money was

not wholly determined by the amount of gold and could be increased even
while the gold stock went down.

Speculation, while exerting a negative

impact on aggregate demand, was not the decisive factor in lowering it.
The previous discussion has been concerned with the depression
itself, but we have also to consider some of its consequences.

Much has

been said about the depression as a major factor in strengthening the
military faction who led Japan on the way to war.

However unfortunate

this turn of events, it cannot negate some positive economic effects.
The depression accelerated already existing trends in changing
the structure of the economy, chief among them a reduction in the role
played by the agricultural sector.

We must also note that one of the aims

of the government in its deflationary·policy(climaxed by the return to
gold) was to create a mild recession which would cause firms and consumers
to'rationalize" their behavior and increase efficiency.

In this respect

it was a repetition of the much acclaimed "Matsukata deflation" in the
1880's, considered as a turning point in early Japanese industrialization.

25

The coincidence of the world depression with this deflationary policy tilted
the economy too far but at the same time did result in a higher level of
efficiency and competitiveness.

This was manifested by Japan's rapid
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recovery from the depression and the large increase in exports since 1931.
It is to be lamented that much of this new potential was directed to war
-efforts rather than to improve the welfare of the Japanese people.

26
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9
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"There is good reason to believe that the press accounts of suffering
among farmers were often more sensational than exact, and that there were
motives of party politics behind the agitation which brought the problem
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The truth is that

agrarian distress is in some

measure endemic inJapan partly because some rice-growing regions are poor
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15
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16
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Commercial College, Research Department Bulletin No. 3 (December 1932), p.27.
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Yukio Cho, Showa Kyoko, (Tokyo, 1973), p. 95. (The Showa Panic)
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of December 1931.

First we have to remember that this devaluation was very

considerable, 50% in one year, while a devaluation in January 1930 would
-have been around 10%.
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geographical distribution of Japanese exports todcplace: between 1929 and
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the share of textiles went down from 67 to 53 per 'Cent.

Moreover, increased

-efficiency due to the depression may well have played a role.
20

M. Friedman and .Anna T. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the
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Likewide the stock
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(Glasgow, 1931), Ch. 4.
22
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Takita claims that the

government was not well prepared for the policy change: a part of specie
holdings was bought from the yokohama Specie Bank and was needed to cover
the deficit in the trade balance, and the terms of foreign credit were
very unfavorable.
23Takita ibid. p. 29.
24

other measures were also taken to stop the purchase of specie for

speculative purposes.

On

October 14, 1931, the Yokohama Specie Bank

_declared that it will not sell specie except for real needs of foreign
trade, and from November l_.of the same year it refused to sell specie for
"speculative imports".

Moral persuasion was also attempted by the Bank

of Japan to restrain buying of foreign exchange by banks.
pp. 40-42.

See Takita ibid.
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25

william W. Lockwood, The Economic Developme nt of Japan (Princeto n,

1954) p. 521.

Incidenta lly, this depressio n also preceded the adoption of

the gold standard in 1897.
2 ~ukai concludes
that: "the great strides made by our export trade are
fundamen tally due to the fact that the productiv e capacity of the nation
was improved during the period of depressio n, making available a supply of
goods at low .. cost" (''Monetar y Policy" p. 393).

Sansom

writes:

"That

rationali zation has been more than a popular phase is patent to anyone who
has spent the last few years in Japan.

The quality and the variety of

Japanese manufactu rers have improved at a remarkabl e rate.

The developme nt

was doubtless not so sudden as it appears .•• But the hard time of 1930 seems
to have accelerat ed the progress, with the result that today in many
fields the Japanese manufactu rer produces a better article than ever, and
at less cost" (Departme nt of Overseas Trade, Economic Condition s in Japan
To December 31, 1973, p. 28).
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Table 1: Rate of Growth - Interna tional Comparison
{percen tage change relative to previou s year - constan t prices)

Japan

u.s.

(GNP)

(GNP)

U.K.
(NNI)

France
(NI)

Germany
(NI)

Sweden
(NI)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

1929

1.1

6.0

4.8

9.9

o.o

7.8

1930

0.9

-8.9

3.8

-0.9

-3.8

2.7

1931

1.2

-5.9

-2.8

-4.5

-11.8

-5.3

1932

4.0

-14.6

-1.6

-6.7

-11.1

-5.6

1933

9.5

-2.9

5.4

o.o

0.5

2.0

Source:
Column (1)

Kazuo Sato, "Daifuky aki no Nihon Keizai" (The Japanese Economy

in the Great Depress ion), Keizai Kenkyu, 27, (January , 1976), p. 5.

Column (2)

Calcula ted from Peter Temin, Did Monetary Forces Cause the

Great Depress ion, (N. Y., 1976), p. 4.

Column (3)

Derek H. Aldcrof t, The Inter-w ar Economy:

Britain , 1919-19 39,

(N. Y., 1970), pp. 32-33.

Columns (4) - (6)

Calculat ed from Ingvar Svennils on, Growth and Stagnat ion

in the European Economy, (Geneva, 1954), p. 233.
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Table 2:

Index of Industrial Production (1929 • 100)

Japan

u. s.

U.K.

France

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Germany

1929

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

166.0

1930

96.9

80.7

92.3

99.1

85.9

1931

93.9

68.1

83.8

86.2

67.6

1932

102.5

53.8

83.5

71.6

53.3

1933

116.9

63.9

88.2

80. 7

60.7

1934

132.4

66.4

98.8

75.2

79.8

1935

149. 3

75.6

165.6

72 .5

94.0

Source:
Column (1) Calculated from Yasukichi Yasuba, "A Revised Index of Indus
trial Production for Japan, 1905-1935", Osaka Economic Papers 19
(March 1971), p. 32.

Column (2) - (5) Bank of Japan, Hundred-Year Statistics of the Japanese
Economy, (Tokyo, 1966), p. 397.
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Table 3:

Unemployment Ratea (%)

Japan

u.s.

U.K.

Germany

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1929

NA

12

8.2

NA

1930

5.3

21

11.8

NA

1931

6.1

26

16.7

23.7

1932

6.8

32'

17 .6

30.1

1933

5.6

31

16.4

25.8

1934

5.0

26

13.9

14.5

1935

4.6

23

13.2

11.6

8unemployment figures are based on different estimates as follows:
Column (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Source:

official estimates
trade union returns
compulsory unemploymen t insurance statistics
employment exchange statistics

League of Nations

Statistical Year Book 1935/36,
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Table 4:

Total volume of exports (Index, 1929

m

100)

Japan

U.K.

Germany

France

.Europe

World

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

1929

100

100

100

100

100

100

1930

97

81

94

90

90

94

1931

100

62

86

77

77

85

1932

123

63

60

59

62

74

1933

133

64

55

60

62

74

Source:
Column (1)

c•lculated from Takafusa Nakamura, Senzenki Nihon Keizai Seicho

no Bunseki (An Analysis of Japan's Economic Growth in the Prewar Period),
(Tokyo, 1971), p. 212.

columns (2) - (4)

Calculated from Svennilson, Growth and Stagaation 1 p. 314.

columns (5) - (6)

Calculated from ibid., p. 292.
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Table 5:

Wholesale prices, 1929 • 100

Japan

u.s.

U.K.

Germany

France

Sweden

1929

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

1930

81.9

83.7

85.2

90.7

86.4

88.9

1931

69.6

63.1

71.1

78.3

73.4

75.4

1932

77.2

52.5

68.9

67.4

64.6

72.2

1933

88.5

58.2

68.1

65.9

62.2

71.4

Source

Column (1) Calculated from Kozo Yamamura, "Then Came the Great Depression,
Japan's Interwar Years" in Herman van der Wee (ed.), The Great Depression
Revisited, (The Hague~ 1972), p. 209.

Column (2) - (6) Calculated from Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation, p. 234.
This index is based on prices of 40 basic commodities.
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Table 6: Prices received by farmers and prices of current
inputs paid by farmers (index, 1934-36 c 100)

Prices received
by farmers

Prices paid
by farmers

(1)

(2)

1929

114.3

123.17

92.8

1930

75.3

93.20

79.4

1931

69.3

70.92

97.7

1932

77 .8

82.92

93.8

1933

85.6

88.00

97.3

(3) = (1) ¼ (2)

Source

Column (1) Umemura, Estimates of Long-term Economic Statistics, Vol. 9,
p. 161.

Column (2) ibid. p. 191.
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Table 7:

Balance of Payments, Japan Proper, Net Balance
(mil Ii on yen)

Merchandise
Trade

Current
Account

Monetary
Gold

Long-time
Capital

Short-term
Capital (a)

(I)

(2)

(3)

( 4)

(5)

I 929

-160.5

88.4

-2.6

-1 64. 6

78.8

I 930

-134.3

43.3

274.5

-303. 7

-14.1

I 931

-206.6

-81.5

370.8

-372.0

82.7

I 932

-134.2

41.8

102.8

-258.0

113.4

I 933

-113.0

43.2

7.7

-215.3

164.4

(a) including errors and omissions

Source

Kazushi Ohkawa et. al., Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of
Japan Since 1868, Vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1974), P· 193.
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Table 8:

Amounts of Bank Notes Issued and Reserves,
the Bank of Japan, (million yen)

Special
Reserves

Security
Reserves

Bank Notes
Issued

Excess of
Issue

(I)

(2)

(3)

I 929

1,072

570

1,642

450

1930

826

610

1,436

490

l 931

470

861

1,331

741

1932

425

1,001

1,426

l

I 933

425

1,120

1,545

120

8

1929-31 (4)

= (3) - (1) - 120, 1931-32 (4) = (3) -

(4)a

(I) - 1000

Source

Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Annual Statistical Report 1933
(Tokyo, 1934), p. 185.
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Table 9:

Currency in Circulation and Demand Deposits (million yen)
Year to Year Changes

Currency
in
( )
circulation a

Demand
desposits of b
ordinary banks()

Total

Demand
desposits of
ordinary banks

Total

(4)

(5)

(6)

Currency
in
circulation

(1)

(2)

1929

1,960

4118

6078

1930

1,763

3735

5498

-197

-383

-580

1931

1,665

3422

5087

-98

-313

-411

1932

1,735

3591

5326

70

169

239

1933

1,858

3810

5668

123

219

342

(a)

(3)

includes government notes, Bank of Japan notes (excluding reserve
against notes issued by other banks), Yokohama Specie Bank silver
notes and subsidiary coins.

(b) Total private deposits minus time deposits.

Source

Column (1) Bank of Japan, Hundred Year Statistics, p. 167

Column (2) ibid., p. 201.

